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Abstract
The control problem by parameters in the course of
the guaranteed state estimation of linear non-stationary
systems is considered. It is supposed that unknown dis-
turbances in the system and the observation channel are
limited by norm in the space of square integrable func-
tions and the initial state of the system is also unknown.
The process of guaranteed state estimation includes the
solution of a matrix Riccati equation that contains some
parameters, which may be chosen at any instant of time
by the first player (an observer) and the second player
(an opponent of the observer). The purposes of players
are diametrically opposite: the observer aims to min-
imize diameter of information set at the end of obser-
vation process, and the second player on the contrary
aims to maximize it. This problem is interpreted as a
differential game with two players for the Riccati equa-
tion. All the choosing parameters are limited to com-
pact sets in appropriate spaces of matrices. The payoff
of the game is interpreted through the Euclidean norm
of the inverse Riccati matrix at the end of the process.
A specific case of the problem with constant matrices is
considered. Methods of minimax optimization, the the-
ory of optimum control, and the theory of differential
games are used. Examples are also given.
Key words
Observations’ control, parameters optimization, dif-
ferential games, guaranteed estimation.
1 Introduction
State estimation problems for linear non-stationary
systems are well studied by now (see, e.g. [Kurzhan-
ski and Va´lyi, 1996; Kurzhanski and Varaiya, 2014],
and the bibliography there). The main mathematical
apparatus for solution is connected here with the the-
ory of control and estimation under uncertainty. In
the special case of estimation with integral constraints
for disturbances, the basic relations are quite similar
to the equations of the well-known Kalman filter. But
in the determinate theory the main object of investiga-
tion is the information set. The diameter of this set
may serve as the quality characteristic of the observa-
tion process. The first player (an observer) tries to min-
imize this diameter, and the second player (an oppo-
nent of the observer) aims to maximize it. Both play-
ers can choose the parameters that lie in compact sets
of matrices at any instant of time. Thus, the problem
may be interpreted as a differential game for the Ric-
cati equation of the process. As the diameter of the
information set is proportional to the Euclidean norm
of the inverse Riccati matrix, the mentioned value is
taken as the payoff of the game. We consider the differ-
ential game in the class ‘counterstrategy/strategy’ and
use the approach connected with the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation, [Krasovskii and Sub-
botin, 1988; Subbotin, 1999; Fleming, Soner, 2006].
We offer two ways that overcome the lack of the Lips-
chitz conditions of Riccati equations and suggest a nu-
merical scheme for the solution of the problem. Note
that problems of observations’ control were considered
in different aspects in [Grigoryev et al., 1986; Kurzhan-
ski and Va´lyi, 1996; Kurzhanski and Varaiya, 2014;
Ananiev, 2011; Ananyev, 2015]. The results of the
work may be used both for quality improvement of
measuring systems and for creation of counteraction
systems of observation.
It is necessary to tell that sometimes methods of the
guaranteed estimation are criticized by estimation spe-
cialists. The main argument is that the nature as the
opponent not always is malicious. However the prob-
lem considered here is not a game with the nature. This
is a game between two players: the observer and his
opponent.
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A few words about the physical sense of the problem.
The following situation can serve as a motivation for
our task. Suppose that an flying object with attackable
hindrances moves above grade and is managed by the
player-opponent (the 2nd player) that is traced by the
player-observer (the 1st player) for the purpose of the
most exact definition of position of the object in fixed
instant (perhaps, for its guaranteed destruction). At the
same time the 1st player can use different vision fa-
cilities and the additional devices reducing the distur-
bances of the object. On the other hand, the 2nd player
interfering the purposes of the 1st one uses active hin-
drances to supervision (false objects, thermal rockets,
etc.) for increase the mistake of the observation. Let us
give
Example 1. Consider the rectilinear movement of an
airplane in the vertical plane at h height: xnom1 =
L + V t, xnom2 = h. The real initial state ~x
0 2 R4
may differed from [L;h;V ; _h] and be unknown. The
deviation from the basic movement is described by the
system
_x1 = x3; _x3 = u1; _x2 = x4; _x4 = u2; t 2 [0; T ];
where x1 = ~x1   xnom1 , x2 = ~x2   h, x3 = ~x3   V ,
x4 = ~x4. The control accelerations are limited by the
constraint u21+u
2
2  1=2. The model of measurements
is of the form ~y =
p
(L  ~x1)2 + ~x22. Setting y(t) =
~y(t)   ynom(t) and linearizing this with respect to the
nominal trajectory, we obtain
y(t) = g1(t)x1 + g2(t)x2 + c(t)v(t);
g1(t) = V t=
p
V 2t2 + h2; g2(t) = h=
p
V 2t2 + h2;
where v(t) is an observation error with the constraintR T
0
v2(t)dt  1. Let us assume that the acceleration
and parameters h; L; V are constant and known for
the observer. The observer can also use the function
c(t), c1  c  c2, in order to improve the estima-
tion. From the other hand, the constant velocity V and
the accelerations u1; u2 may be chosen by the second
player before the observation process for the purpose to
interfere with plans of the observer. Another possible
problem formulation on the contrary assumes that func-
tions g1; g2 may be already chosen by the observer, and
function c(t) is used by the second player for the worst
noise generation in observation. Note that in this ex-
ample the system does not contain the disturbances but
in common case it does.
This work is an extended and improved version of re-
port [Ananyev, 2017]. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 is devoted to the background of guar-
anteed estimation. In section 3 our problem is formu-
lated. In section 4 we consider the most simple case
of constant matrices in the system. A special atten-
tion is paid to conclusions under steady-state solutions
of the Riccati equation. In section 5 we pass to the
common case. Concepts of strategy, and counterstrat-
egy are reminded. The HJBI equation is written down,
and the possibility of its solution in generalized sense
is discussed. In the last section, problems of numerical
solution are considered and some examples are given.
2 Guaranteed Estimation
In this work, we consider the linear non-stationary
equations
_x(t) = A(t)x(t) +B(t)v(t) + u(t); (1)
y(t) = G(t)x(t) + c(t)v(t); t 2 [0; T ]; (2)
containing an uncertain function v(), where x(t) 2
Rn is a state vector, y(t) 2 Rm is an output, v(t) 2 Rk
is an uncertain disturbance, u(t) is a known function;
A(); B(); G(); c() are bounded Borelian matrices.
A matrix A() is a Borelian one, if every its element
aij() is a Borel measurable function. Suppose that the
uncertain function v() in (1) and (2) is constrained by
the inequality
kv()k2 =
Z T
0
jv(t)j2dt  1; (3)
where j  j is the Euclidean norm. Besides, the matrix
c() must satisfy the condition
c(t)c0(t)  Im; 8t 2 [0; T ]; (4)
where  > 0 and Im 2 Rmm is the identity ma-
trix. Hereafter the symbol 0 means the transposition.
According to general theory of guaranteed estimation
[Kurzhanski and Varaiya, 2014] let us give
Definition 1. The collection XT (y) of state vectors
fx(T )g is said to be the information set if for any
x 2 XT (y) there exists a function v() satisfying (3)
and such that equalities (1), (2) hold almost everywhere
(a.e.) with x(T ) = x.
Denote by C(t) the matrix (c(t)c0(t)) 1. Under as-
sumption (4) we have the equalities v(t) = c0(t)w(t)+
C1(t)f(t) and kv()k2 = kc0()w()k2 + kC1()f()k2,
where C1(t) = Ik c0(t)C(t)c(t) is the orthogonal pro-
jection on the subspace ker c(t). Using (2), we may
rewrite inequality (3) as
Z T
0
n
jy(t) G(t)x(t)j2C(t) + jf(t)j2C1(t)
o
dt  1: (5)
From now on the symbol jxj2Q means the quadratic
form x0Qx.
It is easily seen that x 2 XT (y) iff there exists a func-
tion f() satisfying (5) and subjecting to the equation
_x(t) = A(t)x(t) +B(t)C1(t)f(t) + u(t)
+B(t)c0(t)C(t)(y(t) G(t)x(t)) (6)
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with final condition x(T ) = x. On the other hand, such
a function exists iff the minimum of the left-hand side
of inequality (5) is less or equal 1. Thus, using standard
optimization reasonings, we come to the conclusion.
Lemma 1. The information set has the form XT (y) =
x 2 Rn : jxj2P (T )   2d0(T )x + q(T )  1
	
; where
parameters may be found from equations
_P (t) =  P (t)A(t) A0(t)P (t)  P (t)B(t)
B0(t)P (t) + (G(t) + c(t)B0(t)P (t))0
C(t)(G(t) + c(t)B0(t)P (t)); P (0) = 0;
(7)
_d(t) =   A(t) +B(t)B0(t)P (t)0d(t)
+(G(t) + c(t)B0(t)P (t))0C(t)(y(t)
+c(t)B0(t)d(t)) + P (t)u(t); d(0) = 0;
(8)
_q(t) =
y(t)2C(t)   B0(t)d(t)2C1(t)
+2d0(t)u(t); q(0) = 0:
(9)
If the matrix P (t) is invertible on (0; T ], we can in-
troduce the values x^(t) = P 1(t)d(t) and h(t) =
q(t)  d(t)2
P 1(t), which satisfy the equations
_^x(t) = A(t)x^(t) +
 
c(t)B0(t) +G(t)P 1(t))0
C(t)(y(t) G(t)x^(t)) + u(t); (10)
_h(t) =
y(t) G(t)x^(t)2C(t): (11)
The value x^(T ) is the center of bounded ellipsoid
XT (y). A simple sufficient condition for invertibility
of matrix P (t) on (0; T ] is the following.
Assumption 1. LetA(t) = A(t) B(t)c0(t)C(t)G(t).
The solutionsW (t; ) of matrix differential equation
@W (t; )=@t =  A0(t)W (t; ) W (t; )A(t)
+G0(t)G(t); W (; ) = 0;
is positive-definite for all 0   < t  T .
It is well-known (see [Kurzhanski and Varaiya, 2014])
that Assumption 1 is equivalent to full observability of
the system _x(t) = A(t)x(t)+B(t)C1(t)f(t)with mea-
surement equation (2), where v = 0, on any interval
[; t].
3 Problem Formulation
Consider our observation process as a differential
game for Riccati equation (7). This may be described
as follows. Let matrices B, G, and c in equations (1),
(2) depend on three arguments: time t, a, and b. Param-
eters a and b (may be functions of t) belong to compact
sets in finite dimensional spaces:
a(t) 2 A  Rna ; b(t) 2 B  Rnb : (12)
Assume that matrix functions B(t; ; ), G(t; ; ), c(t;
; ) are continuous for every t and functions B(; a; b),
G(; a; b), c(; a; b) are bounded and measurable for ev-
ery possible a, b. Condition (4) holds as before. At any
instant t, the parameter b in (12) can be chosen by a
second player (opponent) who tries to make the worse
quality of observation process. On the other hand, the
parameter a can be chosen by a first player (observer)
who tries to make the best quality of observation pro-
cess. Both players evaluate the quality of observation
by the terminal payoff
(XT (y)); (13)
where () is a non-negative continuous function de-
fined on all compact sets in Rn. The continuity is
understood in the sense of Hausdorff’s convergence.
For example, (X) = max
x2X
jxj or (X) = diamX
= maxx;y2X jx   yj: In our case, diamXT (u; y) =
2
p
(1  h(T ))jP 1(T )j, where jP j = max
jxj1
jPxj is
the Euclidean norm of matrix P that does not depend
on the function u() in equation (1). The value of
maximal deviation max
x2XT (u;y)
jxj = max
jlj1

l0x^(T ) +p
1  h(T ) jljP 1(T )
	
does depend due to x^(T ).
So, the first player tries to minimize the payoff, and
his opponent tries to maximize. The formulas for pay-
off (13) result from the expression of support func-
tion of the set XT (y), (ljXT (y)) = max
x2XT (y)
l0x =
l0x^(T )+
p
1  h(T )jljP 1(T ): Therefore, the diameter
max
x;y2XT (y)
jx  yj equals 2p(1  h(T ))jP 1(T )j. The
value h(T ) may be selected by the second player who
supposes h(T ) = 0 to maximize the diameter. More-
over, we believe that P (T ) > 0. Otherwise, we can
choose the pseudoinverse matrix P  instead of P 1.
By the way, it is not necessary because Assumption 1
always will be presumed further. Besides, suppose that
both players choose their control parameters in (12)
since some instant t0, 0 < t0 < T . On the initial seg-
ment [0; t0] the parameters of (12) are equal to some
known values from the set A; B. Therefore, the ob-
server gets the set X0 = Xt0(y) at the instant t0.
It can turn out that h(t0) = 1. In this case the resource
of disturbances is exhausted and we have v(t) = 0 for
t  t0. If so, we obtain x(t0) = x^(t0) and y(t) 
G(t)x^(t) for t  t0. Our problem reduces to the ordi-
nary control one for a linear system (1) with complete
information on the state vector. Of course, the second
player can maximize the payoff (13) with the help of
u() when the payoff is the maximal deviation. But
in this paper, as a rule, we consider the function u()
known to the observer. If h(t0) < 1, we obtain more
complicated situation. It is easily seen from equations
(10), (11), that the evolution of information set Xt(y)
depends only on the control parameters in (12) and the
innovation function w(t) = y(t)   G(t)x^(t) that sat-
isfies the LQ-constraints
R T
t0
jw(t)j2C(t)  1   h(t0):
We assume that the function w() is chosen by Nature
and players can not influence it. But, for simplicity in
this paper, the Nature does its choice only on the initial
segment [0; t0], and after that the vector function w()
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can be chosen by the second player who maximizes the
diameter and supposes w() = 0. So, we obtain the
differential game with complete information for Ric-
cati equation (7) and equation (10), where no controls
are present. Therefore, we can suppose that our payoff
(XT (y)) = s(P 1(T )) depends only on the inverse
matrix P 1(T ). The function s() is continuous. For
convenience we denote by Q(t) the matrix P 1(t) and
obtain the equation
_Q(t) = A(t)Q(t) +Q(t)A0(t) +B(t)B0(t)
 (G(t)Q(t) + c(t)B0(t))0C(t)
(G(t)Q(t) + c(t)B0(t)); Q(t0) = P 1(t0):
(14)
Further we deal with equation (14). The exact defi-
nition for the control strategies of the players is given
below. Note that we mostly play for the second player
and admit positional counterstrategies a(t;Q; b) of the
observer who discriminates against his opponent.
4 Optimization of Riccati Equation with Time-
Invariant Parameters
Let all the matrices in relations (1), (2), (4), and (12)
be time-invariant. Moreover, we use the constant pa-
rameters a, b in this section. Consider the low value
 = maxbmina s(Q(T )) of the game and its upper
value  = minamaxb s(Q(T )). Always we have
  , and the strong inequality  >  may
be realised. From now on, we use the standard nota-
tion from Matlab, where [A1; : : : ; Ak] means the row-
concatenation of matrices of appropriate dimensions
(sometimes, the comma is replaced by the blank), and
[A1; : : : ;Ak] means the column-concatenation.
Example 2. Consider a two-dimensional system with
A = 0, G = I2, c = [O2; I2], where I2 2 R22
is the identity matrix, and O2 2 R22 is the zero
matrix. Besides, the matrix B =

[a
p
b; 0; 0; (1  
a)
p
1  b]; O2

, where 0  a  1 and 0  b 
1. Let s(Q(T )) = jP 1(T )j. The solution of
Riccati equation (7) is equal to the diagonal matrix
[p1(t); 0; 0; p2(t)], where p1(t) = tanh(
p
bat)=(
p
ba),
p2(t) = tanh(
p
1  b(1  a)t)=(p1  b(1  a)). For
T = 5 we have  = 0:5068,  = 0:3751.
Let us solve our game in the class ‘counterstrate-
gy/strategy’, when the first player may use any func-
tions a(b) 2 A. In this case, the game has a saddle
point (see [Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988; Fleming,
Soner, 2006]) and the value of game
 = max
b2B
min
a()
s(Q(T )) = min
a()
max
b2B
s(Q(T )) (15)
that is equal to . There are a simpler case of our
game.
Assumption 2. Consider the case s(Q(T )) =
jP 1(T )j. Let c = c(b); B = g(a)r(b); G = G(a),
and let constraints (12) satisfy the conditions: there
is an element b 2 B, such that rr0  rr0, cc0
 cc0; 8b 2 B, where r = r(b), c = c(b),
and Bc0  0. Hereafter the inequality A  B
means jxj2A  jxj2B , for all x, where A; B are square
symmetrical matrices.
Theorem 1. Under assumption 2 the optimization is
fulfilled only on the parameter a 2 A, and the value
of the game equals  =  = mina jP 1(T )j; where
matrices r; c are substituted in equation (7).
Proof. First note that the matrix P (t) is a solution of
the following linear-quadratic problem
x0P (t)x = inf
v()
Z t
0
 
x0(s)G0CGx(s) + jv(s)j2ds;
where _x(s) = Ax(s) + Bv(s), x(t) = x. As
C  C > 0 and  rr0   rr0, we have P (t; a; b) 
P (t; a; b) > 0 for all a 2 A; b 2 B. Therefore,
jP 1(t; a; b)j  jP 1(t; a; b)j. Taking into account
the compactness of A; B and the continuity of the pay-
off, we prove the theorem. 
Now consider stationary solutions of Riccati equation
(7). Such solutions arise under very long time of obser-
vation. We make
Assumption 3. The system _x = Ax + BC1f; y =
Gx + cv, where A = A   Bc0CG (see Assump-
tion 1 and equation (6)), is completely obser-
vable and completely controllable, i.e. rank

BC1;
ABC1; : : : ;An 1BC1

= n, rank

G;GA; : : : ;
GAn 1

= n; cc0 > 0, 8a 2 A, 8b 2 B.
It is known [Liptser and Shiryayev, 2001] that under
assumption 3 there exists a unique positive-definite so-
lutions of stationary Riccati equations
 A0P   PA+G0CG  PBC1B0P = 0;
AQ+QA0 +BC1B0  QG0CGQ = 0;
(16)
and Q = P 1. Condition (16) may be considered as
an equality condition for minimax problem (15).
Example 3. Let s(Q) = jQj, A = [0; 1; 0; 0].
The matrises g =

[1; a1; a1; 1] : 0  a1  1
	
; r =
[
p
1  b1; 0; 0; 2
p
b1]; O2

: 0:1  b1  1
	
,
G =

[1   a2 0; 0 4a2] : 0  a2  0:9
	
, c =
O2; [
p
1  b2 0; 0
p
b2]

: 0:1  b2  0:9
	
. The
assumption 3 holds, but assumption 2 does not hold. It
is required to find the value of the game and optimal
counterstrategies a(b) 2 R2 delivering the minimum
in (15) and optimal strategies b 2 R2. The value of
the game is approximately equals 1:1305. It is reached
at a = [0; 0:28], b = [0:2120; 0:4920]. The optimal
functions a1; a

2 are shown on Fig. 1 and 2.
The program for this example uses a grid on uncertain
parameters with the step  = 0:05.
5 Common Case
At first, let us return to example 1.
Example 4. In example 1, we consider the constant
vector parameter b = [V ;u1;u2] 2 R3 of second
player and constant parameter a(b) = c(b) 2 R of
the observer. His opponent tries to maximize the value
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Figure 1. Optimal counterstrategy a1 .
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Figure 2. Optimal counterstrategy a2 .
of maximal deviation s(Q(T )) = max
x2XT (u;y)
jxj =
max
jlj1
n
l0x^(T ) +
p
1  h(T )jljP 1(T )
o
. Numerical
data: 100  V  140, L = 250, h = 500,
0:7  c  1:4, T = 20. The aircraft moves uni-
formly with initial deviations x01 = 2, x
0
2 =  2,
x03 =  1, x04 = 0:2. The first player observes a sig-
nal y(t) = g1(t)x1 + g2(t)x2 + cv(t), where the dis-
turbance v(t) = sin t=
p
2T   sin 2T satisfies the con-
straint. The system is completely observable but the
matrix P (t) > 0 is very ill-conditioned here. Never-
theless, the observer can find his optimal strategy de-
pending on the velocity. Its spline approximation on
ten data is shown on Fig. 3.The maxmin of the deviation is equal to 229:64. It is
reached at c = 0:78 and V = 122, u = [ 0:27; 0:65].
On Fig. 4 we see the very narrow projection of the set
XT (u; y) on the plane x1; x2, where the x is the center
of ellipsoid, star near the center is the real position, and
the second star is the projection of maximizer. Note
that under s(Q(T )) = jP 1(T )j the optimal strategy
of the observer is constant and equals c = 0:7. It does
not depend on V , it follows from equations (7), (14).
Now we pass to positional strategies depending on t.
Unfortunately, Riccati equations (7), (14) do not sat-
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Figure 3. Dependence of parameter c on the nominal velocity V .
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Figure 4. The projection of optimal setXT (u; y) on x1; x2.
isfy the Lipschitz condition. These ones are present
in almost all works on differential games [Krasovskii
and Subbotin, 1988; Souganidis, 1985; Souganidis,
1999; Subbotin, 1999; Taras’ev et. al., 2006; Flem-
ing, Soner, 2006]. Nevertheless, we can overcome
this difficulty at least in two ways. Remember that
we deal with equation (14) on the time interval [t0; T ]
with Q0 = Q(t0) > 0, u(t)  0. At first,
we transform the Riccati equation by fractional de-
composition and write Q(t) = M(t)N 1(t); where
M(); N() are differentiable and nonsingular matrix
functions. Using the relation _N 1 =  N 1 _NN 1
and substitutingM(t)N 1(t) into (14) (see also (16)),
we obtain the equality _M(t)   M(t)N 1(t) _N(t) =
A(t)M(t) +B(t)C1(t)B0(t)N(t) M(t)N 1(t)G0(t)
C(t)G(t)M(t) + M(t)N 1(t)A0(t)N(t), which
may be satisfied by two solutions of the linear matrix
equations
_M(t) = A(t)M(t) +B(t)C1(t)B0(t)N(t);
_N(t) = G0(t)C(t)G(t)M(t) A0(t)N(t);
(17)
where A(t) = A(t)   B(t)c0(t)C(t)G(t). The initial
conditions for equations (17) may be chosen as M0 =
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Q0 = Q(t0); N0 = In.
From now on, we accept the analog of assumption 3
for non-stationary systems.
Assumption 4. The matrix PB(; t) =
R t

X(t; r)
B(r)C1(r)B0(r)X0(t; r)dr > 0, 8; t, 0   <
t  T , for all measurable parameter functions
a(r) 2 A, b(r) 2 B that are included in sys-
tem matrices. Hereafter X(t; r) is the fundamen-
tal matrix, for which @X(t; r)=@t = A(t)X(t; r),
X(r; r) = In. Besides, the matrix PG(; t) =R t

X0(r; t)G0(r)C(r)G(r)X(r; t)dr > 0; 8; t; 0 
 < t  T; for all measurable parameter functions.
Under assumption 4, it follows from [Liptser and
Shiryayev, 2001] that the matrix Q(t) is nonsingular
for any t 2 (0; T ]. Moreover, due to the compactness
of constraints (12), the nonsingularity will be uniform
on any time interval [t0; T ], t0 > 0, with respect to all
measurable parameter functions. The same may be told
about matricesM(t) and N(t).
Thus, our differential game is reduced to the game
with linear matrix equations (17). The payoff (T ) =
s(Q(T )) of the game is a continuous function of the
final state if
Q(T ) = M(T )N 1(T ); s(Q) = jMN 1j; or
s(Q) = max
jlj1
n
l0x^(T ) +
p
1  h(t0)jljQ
o
;
where x^(T ) is the end of trajectory of the homo-
geneous equation _^x(t) = A(t)x^(t) with the initial
state x^(t0). The initial state is known. Any func-
tions a(t;M;N; b) 2 A of t, the state fM;Ng, and
the parameter b 2 B satisfying the constraints, will
be consider for the strategies of the first player who
tries to minimize (T ). The strategies of the second
player, who tries to maximize (T ), are any functions
b(t;M;N) 2 B. The controls of the first player are
said to be counterstrategies, [Krasovskii and Subbotin,
1988]. The solution of the (17) is defined step-by-
step with the help of piecewise-constant controls as in
[Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988], [Subbotin, 1999, p.
7]. In these works, a concept of the value of the game
in the class ‘counterstrategy/strategy’ is explained in
detail. The game has the saddle point and the value
c(t0;M0; N0), where t0 2 (0; T ], if the game begins
from the position (t0;M0; N0).
In our problem, one needs to find a saddle point (a
value of the game)
 = c(t0;M0; N0) (18)
and corresponding optimal strategies a(; ; ; ),
b(; ; ). For problem’s solution one need to build
a function c(t;M;N) giving the value of the game
under different initial positions (t;M;N). Under as-
sumptions 4 we may suppose that there exist constants
; , such that 0 <   P (t); P 1(t)   for all
t 2 [t0; T ], t0 > 0, and for all control parameters. At
the final instant the boundary condition c(T;M;N) =
jMN 1j must hold.
As in section 4, the game become simpler under the
following
Assumption 5. Let the compact sets A(t); B(t) in
(12)may depend on time and let c(t) = c(t; b); B(t) =
g(t; a)r(t; b), G(t) = G(t; a). The constraints satisfy
the conditions: there is a function b(t) 2 B(t), such
that r(t)r0(t)  r(t)r0(t), c(t)c0(t)  c(t)c0(t),
8b 2 B, where r(t) = r(t; b(t)), c(t) = c(t; b(t)).
Besides, the relation B(t)c0(t) = 0 must hold.
Theorem 2. Under assumption 5 the game is reduced
to a problem of optimal control over the functions
a(t) 2 A(t). The value of the game equals  =  =
mina() jQ(T )j; where matrix functions r(t); c(t) are
substituted in equation (14).
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 1. Indeed,
the matrix Q(t) is a solution of the following linear-
quadratic problem
x0Q(t)x = min
v()
Z t
t0
fx0(r)B(r)B0(r)x(r)+
v0(r)c(r)c0(r)v(r)gdr + x0(t0)Q0x(t0)

; _x(r)
=  A0(t)x(r) +G0(t)v(r); r 2 [t0; t]; x(t) = x:
Therefore, the functions r(); c() are maximizers
of jQ(T )j independently of the functions a(). 
5.1 HJBI Equation
For our case, in [Subbotin, 1999, Theorem 9.1] it
was proved that the value of the game equals  =
c(t0;M0; N0), where the function c : [t0; T ]Rnn
Rnn ! R satisfies (in corresponding minimax for-
malization) the equation
@c(t;M;N)=@t+H(t;M;N;Dc) = 0 (19)
with boundary condition c(T;M;N) = jMN 1j. In
equation (19) the symbol Dc means the generalized
gradient of function c(t;M;N) with respect to vari-
ables M;N , and the Hamiltonian H is defined by the
following way
H(t;M;N;;	) = max
b2B
min
a2A
h(t; a; b;M;N;
;	);
(20)
where h(t; a; b;M;N;;	) =


;A(t)M(t) +
B(t)C1(t)B0(t)N(t)

+


	; G0(t)C(t)G(t)M(t)  
A0(t)N(t)

. Here the inner product hA;Bi means
traceA0B. If the function c(t;M;N) has been built,
the optimal strategies of first and second players are
defined as selectors of inclusions
a(t;M;N; b) 2 Argmin
a2A
h(t; a; b;M;N;
Dc(t;M;N)); b(t;M;N) 2 Argmax
b2B
min
a2A
h(t;
a; b;M;N;Dc(t;M;N)):
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It is known that the solution of (19) in minimax sense
coincides with viscosity solution (see [Subbotin, 1999;
Fleming, Soner, 2006]). Note that both the solutions
are unique.
6 A Numerical Solution
A numerical procedure can be built on the base of
[Souganidis, 1985; Souganidis, 1999; Taras’ev et. al.,
2006]. Here we do not perform a decomposition and
consider initial equation (14) on the interval [t0; T ],
t0 > 0. Denote by F (t;Q; a; b) the right-hand side
of this equation. Let us establish some properties of
solutions of equation (14). By Kn; we denote the seg-
ment of nonnegative-defined and simmetrical matrices
A : 0  In  A  In
	
=

A :   jAj  	.
The matrix A(t) will be considered Lipschitzean in t.
Lemma 2. Let assumption 4 hold. Then solutions of
equation (14), the mappings F (t;Q; a; b) and the final
payoff s(Q), possess the following properties.
R1. For any instant t0 2 (0; T ) there exist positive con-
stants ;  that do not depend on control parame-
ters and such that Q(t) 2 Kn; ; 8t 2 [t0; T ].
R2. The function F (t;Q; a; b) may be continued on the
set [t0; T ]  Rnn  A  B in such a way that
it is bounded and the uniform Lipschitz condition
jF (t1; Q1; a; b)   F (t2; Q2; a; b)j  C1
 jQ1  
Q2j+ jt1   t2j

holds.
R3. The function s(Q), Q 2 Kn; , may be continued
on the spaceRnn in such a way that it is bounded
and the Lipschitz condition js(Q1)   s(Q2)j 
C2jQ1  Q2j holds.
The lemma may be proved with the help of the Kirsz-
braun theorem (see [Federer, 1969, Theorem 2.10.43])
about the continuation of Lipschitzean maps.
Henceforth, we believe that the mappings F and s
are continued due to lemma 2. The Hamiltonian is
now defined as H(t; Q; S) = maxb2Bmina2A h(t; a;
b;Q; S), where h(t; a; b;Q; S) =


S; F (t;Q; a; b)

:
The function c : [t0; T ]  Rnn ! R (the value of
the game) satisfies in corresponding formalization the
HJBI equation
@c(t;Q)=@t+H(t; Q;Dc) = 0: (21)
Here the symbol Dc 2 Rnn means the gradient of
c(t;Q) and is the matrix. For approximation of c(t; Q),
we consider the partition  = ft0 < t1 <    <
tN()+1 = Tg of the interval [t0; T ]. The diameter
maxi jti+1   tij of the partition is denoted by jj. De-
fine the function c : [t0; T ]Rnn ! R as
c(T;Q) = s(Q) on Rnn;
c(t;Q) = max
b2B
min
a2A

c(ti+1; Q
+(ti+1   t)F (ti+1; Q; a; b)
	
;
if t 2 [ti; ti+1); and i 2 0 : N():
(22)
Using [Souganidis, 1999, Theorem 4.4], we obtain
Theorem 3. Under jj ! 0, the function (22) con-
verges to c(t; P ) locally uniformly on [0; T ]  Rnn.
The function c(t; P ) is the unique solution of equation
(21) in minimax or viscosity sense. Besides, there exists
a constant K(C2; jjcjj; jjcP jj), such that jc(t; P )  
c(t; P )j  Kjj1=2 for all (t; P ) 2 [0; T ]  Rnn.
Here jj  jj is the sup-norm of corresponding functions.
We can suggest the following numerical algorithm.
1. Choose a finite set (a grid) N = kPj	, k 2 0 :
N1, j 2 1 : N2, where

Pj
	
is a collection of
positive-definite matrices of small norm. The set
must be contained in the segmentKn0; , which uni-
formly covers the attainability domains of the Ric-
cati equation.
2. Select a partition  = ft0 < t1 <    < tN+1 =
Tg of [t0; T ].
3. Form and remember the function cN (Q) =
maxb2Bmina2A s
 
Q + (tN+1   tN )F (tN+1; Q;
a; b)

and corresponding optimal controls bN and
aN (b).
4. On subsequent steps the grid function is formed:
ci(Q) = maxb2Bmina2A ci+1
 
Q + (ti+1   ti)
F (ti+1; Q; a; b)

and corresponding optimal con-
trols bi and a

i (b). If the value Q + (ti+1  
ti)F (ti+1; Q; a; b) does not lie in the grid, then this
value is changed for the nearest element from N .
5. The value c0(Q) gives an approximate value of the
game.
Example 5. Consider the system of example 3 and
suppose that t0 = 1, T = 10. Equation (21) is of
the form
@c(t; Q)=@t+


Dc(t; Q); AQ+QA0

+max
b2B
min
a2A


Dc(t;Q); grr0g0  QG0CGQ:
Bymethod based on above algorithm, we get the value
c0(Q(1)) = 1:104 that close to the value in example
3. Note that the solutions of the Riccati equation are
fast stabilized here to the steady-state solution under
all control parameters.
Example 6. Let us optimize the estimation for the
two-dimensional oscillating system
_x(t) = Ax(t) + g(t)r(t)v(t);
y(t) = G(t)x(t) + c(t)v(t);
on the interval [0; T ], where T = 2, A = [0; 1; 1;
0]. The control parameters are:
G(t) = [a(t); 0; 0; 1  a(t)] with 0  a(t)  1;
r(t) =

[0; 0; 0; b1(t)]; O2

; g(t) = [0; 0; 0; a1(t)];
where a1(t); b1(t) 2 [ 1; 1]; c(t) = [O2; c1(t)]
with I2  c1(t)c01(t)  I2. Here the case when
the assumption 5 holds, i.e. the 2-nd player chooses
c1(t)c
0
1(t) = I2 and b1(t)  1. Therefore, we obtain
the Riccati equation in the form _P (t) =  A0P (t)  
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P (t)A + G2(t) because the observer chooses a1(t) 
0. The equation has the explicit solution, and we have
P 1(T ) =
R T
0
X(T   t)G2(t)X 0(T   t)dt
 1
,
where the matrix X(t) = [cos t; sin t;  sin t; cos t].
Here the functional jP 1(T )j is concave in variable
function a(). Hence, the approximate optimal solution
is a piecewise constant function with values in f0; 1g.
In the class of constant functions the minimal value of
the functional equals  1.
7 Conclusion
The problem of observations’ control for non-sta-
tionary linear systems is considered. The quality of ob-
servation is measured by the diameter of information
set at the end of time interval or the maximal deviation
of this set from the origin. The problem is reduced to
a differential game for the Riccati equations, where the
first part of parameters is chosen by the first player (an
observer) and the second part is chosen by the second
player (an opponent) who tries to worsen the quality
of observation. In the common case, there are a sad-
dle point in the class ‘counterstrategy/strategy’. The
value of the game may be found by integration of cor-
responding HJBI equation, the solution of which is un-
derstood in a generalized sense. The optimal strategies
are also defined due to this solution. The numerical ap-
proximation is specified and the estimation of the rate
of convergence is given for the approximating scheme.
Particular cases of the equations with constant coeffi-
cients are considered, and the solutions for steady-state
regimes of the Riccati equation are given. The exam-
ples are considered as well.
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